Plato, Meno 73a

ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί; ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις. τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν; ἔγωγε. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα; οὐ δῆτα.

And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man? I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases. Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house? I was. And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly?