Plato, Meno 78c

δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι; ἔγωγε. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον; καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς. μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ

is ability to procure goods. I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter. Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods? I do. And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth? Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honors and offices. Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods? No, I refer only to everything of that sort.