Plato, Meno 79a

ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία. δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; ναί. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με; τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθʼ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή

and whatever comes without any such quality, vice. I agree that it must be as you say. And were we saying a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue—justice and temperance and the rest of them? Yes. And here you are, Meno, making fun of me? How so, Socrates? Because after my begging you not to break up virtue into small change, and giving you a pattern on which you should answer, you have ignored all this, and now tell me that virtue is