Plato, Laws 627d

ἡττωμένων· οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον, ἀλλʼ ὀρθότητός τε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστὶν φύσει. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις. καλῶς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε· τούτοις τοῖς ἄρτι λεγομένοις ἀδελφοῖς γένοιτʼ ἄν πού τις δικαστής; πάνυ γε. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων, ὅστις τοὺς μὲν ἀπολέσειεν

but self-superior if they were defeated; for our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with the propriety or impropriety of verbal phrases but with the essential rightness or wrongness of laws. Very true, Stranger. And finely spoken, too, up to this point, as I agree. Let us also look at this point: the brothers we have just described would have, I suppose, a judge? Certainly. Which of the two would be the better—a judge who destroyed