Plato, Laws 644c

ποτὲ λέγομεν. καί μοι διʼ εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς ὑμῖν γένωμαι δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον. λέγε μόνον. οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν; ναί. δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὣ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην; ἔστι ταῦτα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης

what we meant by this. With your permission, I will make use of an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter. Go ahead. May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit? Yes. And that each possesses within himself two antagonistic and foolish counsellors, whom we call by the names of pleasure and pain? That is so. And that, besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future, which go by the general name of expectations; and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special name of fear, and that which precedes pleasure the special name of confidence;