Plato, Laws 662d

ἆρʼ ὁ δικαιότατός ἐστιν βίος ἥδιστος, ἢ δύʼ ἐστόν τινε βίω, οἷν ὁ μὲν ἥδιστος ὢν τυγχάνει, δικαιότατος δʼ ἕτερος; εἰ δὴ δύο φαῖεν, ἐροίμεθʼ ἂν ἴσως αὐτοὺς πάλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐπανερωτῷμεν· ποτέρους δὲ εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρὴ λέγειν, τοὺς τὸν δικαιότατον ἢ τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον διαβιοῦντας βίον; εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον, ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίγνοιτο. βούλομαι δέ μοι μὴ ἐπὶ θεῶν λέγεσθαι τὸ

or are there two lives, of which the one is most pleasant, the other most just? If they replied that there were two, we might well ask them further, if we were to put the correct question; Which of the two ought one to describe as the happier, those that live the most just or those that live the most pleasant life? If they replied, Those that live the most pleasant life, that would be a monstrous statement in their mouths. But I prefer not to ascribe such statements to gods, but rather to ancestors and lawgivers: