Plato, Laws 693c

τὰ δὲ προτεθέντα οὐ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε· ἀλλὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι χρή, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν φῶμεν δεῖν βλέπειν, ἢ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ φιλίαν, ὡς ἔσθʼ οὗτος ὁ σκοπὸς οὐχ ἕτερος ἀλλʼ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω. πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν οὕτως ἐπανιόντες τοὺς λόγους· καὶ νῦν δὴ τὸ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τε καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πρὸς ὅτι βουλόμενος ἔμελλες λέγειν δεῖν στοχάζεσθαι

the various ends thus proposed are apparently different. One needs to reflect that wisdom and friendship, when stated to be the aim in view, are not really different aims, but identical and, if we meet with many other such terms, let not this fact disturb us. We shall endeavor to bear this in mind as we traverse the arguments again. But for the moment, as regards friendship, wisdom and freedom,—tell us,