Plato, Laws 696b

ὑμῖν θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ διεμαντεύσατό τινος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστιν πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδʼ ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς, οὐδʼ ἀρετῆς ἧς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ. πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις; ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἀρετῆς ἕν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; δίκασον τοίνυν αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας εἴ σοι δέξαιʼ ἂν σύνοικον ἢ γείτονα εἶναί τινα σφόδρα μὲν ἀνδρεῖον, μὴ σώφρονα δὲ ἀλλʼ ἀκόλαστον.

beyond what your original oracle declared at the bidding of some god. Nor indeed is it right that pre-eminent honors in a State should be conferred on a man because he is specially wealthy, any more than it is right to confer them because he is swift or comely or strong without any virtue, or with a virtue devoid of temperance. What do you mean by that, Stranger? Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue. Certainly. Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous, but licentious rather than temperate.