Plato, Laws 696d

τιμήσεων ἕνεκα, ποῖαί τε ὀρθαὶ καὶ μὴ γίγνονται ἑκάστοτε. τὸ ποῖον; σωφροσύνη ἄνευ πάσης τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον ἢ ἄτιμον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν κατὰ δίκην; οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως εἴπω. καὶ μὴν εἴρηκάς γε μετρίως· εἰπὼν γὰρ δὴ ὧν ἠρόμην ὁποτερονοῦν, παρὰ μέλος ἔμοιγʼ ἂν δοκεῖς φθέγξασθαι. καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη. εἶεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρόσθημα ὧν τιμαί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαι

Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong. What point? If temperance existed alone in a man’s soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse? I cannot tell what reply to make. Yet, in truth, you have made a reply, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would have said what is, to my mind, quite out of tune. So it has turned out to be all right. Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in objects deserving of honor