Plato, Laws 697a

ἔχει ταύτῃ. τί οὖν; οὐ νομοθέτου καὶ ταῦτα αὖ φήσομεν εἶναι διανέμειν; καὶ μάλα. βούλει δὴ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐφʼ ἕκαστον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐκείνῳ δῶμεν νεῖμαι, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν, ἐπειδὴ νόμων ἐσμὲν καὶ αὐτοί πως ἐπιθυμηταί, πειραθῶμεν, διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὴν μέλλουσαν

Just so. Well then, shall we not declare that the distribution of these things is the lawgiver’s task? Certainly. Is it your wish that we should hand over the whole distribution to him, to deal with every case and all the details, while we—as legal enthusiasts ourselves also—confine ourselves to making a threefold division, and endeavor to distinguish what comes first in importance, and what second and third? By all means. We declare, then, that a State which is to endure,