Plato, Laws 860d

ὡς οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί· τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀνάγκη που τούτῳ συνέπεσθαι τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον. τίνα λέγεις; ὡς ὁ μὲν ἄδικός που κακός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων τοιοῦτος. ἀκουσίως δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαί ποτε λόγον· ἄκων οὖν ἐκείνῳ φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ἀδικεῖν ὁ ἀδικῶν τῷ τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀκούσιον τιθεμένῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁμολογητέον ἐμοί· σύμφημι γὰρ ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας—εἰ καί τις φιλονικίας

That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith. What statement do you mean? This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who,