Plato, Laws 861c

ὀρθῶς εἴρηκεν, κατανομοθετήσει τινὰ τρόπον; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη πως ταῦτα ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νομοθετεῖν δηλῶσαι δύο τε ὄντα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἄλλην, ἵνα, ὅταν ἑκατέρῳ τις τὴν δίκην ἐπιτιθῇ, πᾶς ἐπακολουθῇ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δυνατὸς ᾖ τό τε πρεπόντως τεθὲν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ κρῖναι καὶ τὸ μή. καλῶς ἡμῖν φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ ξένε· δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἡμᾶς χρεών, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ὡς πάντα ἀκούσια τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἢ

That is impossible; and before we legislate we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrong-doings are two-fold, and wherein their difference consists, in order that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules, and be able to form some judgment regarding the suitability or otherwise of our enactments. What you say, Stranger, appears to us to be excellent: we ought to do one of two things,—either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else make our distinctions first,