Plato, Laws 876a

αὖ περὶ τοῦ τί δεῖ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πάσχειν τί χρεὼν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα τούτων τι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν περὶ πάντων νομοθετῆσαι σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων, σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. τίς οὖν ὁ μετὰ τοῦτον λόγος; ὅδε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον δικαστηρίοις, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, ἀλλʼ αὐτῷ νομοθετητέον. ποῖα δὴ νομοθετητέον τε καὶ ποῖα ἀποδοτέον κρίνειν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις; τάδε δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ὀρθότατʼ ἂν εἰπεῖν εἴη, ὡς ἐν

and it is practically impossible for the lawgiver to refuse in all cases to commit to the courts the question regarding the proper penalty or fine to be inflicted on the culprit, and himself to pass laws respecting all such cases, great and small. What, then, is to be our next statement? This,—that some matters are to be committed to the courts, while others are not to be so committed, but enacted by the lawgiver. What are the matters to be enacted, and what are to be handed over to the law courts for decision? It will be best to make the following statement next,—