Plato, Laws 891d

γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ὅπῃ, πειρῶ φράζειν. ἔοικεν τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἁπτέον εἶναι λόγων. οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένε. μανθάνω γὰρ ὡς νομοθεσίας ἐκτὸς οἰήσῃ βαίνειν, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτώμεθα

of no small importance if it can be shown that those who handle impious arguments, and lead others after them, employ their arguments not only ill, but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs. Well said; but try to explain wherein the error lies. We shall probably have to handle rather an unusual argument. We must not shrink, Stranger. You think, I perceive, that we shall be traversing alien ground, outside legislation, if we handle such arguments. But if there is no other way in which it is possible for us to speak in concert with the truth, as now legally declared,