Plato, Laws 901c

τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; νῦν δὴ δύʼ ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν

or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for. Of course not. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small.