Plato, Laws 935d

ἄνευ τοῦ γελοῖα ζητεῖν λέγειν οὐ δυνατός ἐστιν χρῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο λοιδοροῦμεν, ὁπόταν θυμῷ γιγνόμενον ᾖ· τί δὲ δή; τὴν τῶν κωμῳδῶν προθυμίαν τοῦ γελοῖα εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους λέγειν ἦ παραδεχόμεθα, ἐὰν ἄνευ θυμοῦ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἐπιχειρῶσιν κωμῳδοῦντες λέγειν; ἢ διαλάβωμεν δίχα τῷ παίζειν καὶ μή, καὶ παίζοντι μὲν ἐξέστω τινὶ περί του λέγειν γελοῖον ἄνευ θυμοῦ, συντεταμένῳ

What then? Are we to countenance the readiness to ridicule people which is shown by comic writers, provided that in their comedies they employ this sort of language about citizens without any show of passion? Or shall we divide ridicule under the two heads of jest and earnest, and allow anyone to ridicule any other in jest and without passion,