Plato, Epinomis 980a

καλῶς. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὴ ῥητέον ἀνάγκῃ πρῶτον, ὡς φαίνεται, μάλιστα μὲν ἄν, εἰ δυνάμεθα ἑνὶ λαβεῖν ὀνόματι, τίς ἐστιν ἣν οἰόμεθα σοφίαν εἶναι, τοῦτο δʼ εἰ σφόδρα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, τὸ δεύτερον, τίνες εἰσίν ποτε καὶ ὁπόσαι τινές, ἅς τις λαβὼν σοφὸς ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον. λέγοις ἄν. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀνεμέσητον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ κάλλιον τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄμεινον ἀπεικάζοντι λέγειν, οἷον παιδιᾷ καλῇ χρωμένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι

Thank you. To begin with, then, we must necessarily state first, it would seem best of all, in a single word, if we are able so to put it—what is that which we suppose to be wisdom; but if we are utterly unable to do this, we must say in the second place what and how many kinds of it there are that a man must have acquired, if he is to be wise according to our story. Pray speak on. And as to the next step, it will be no offence in the lawgiver that he speaks finer things than have been previously said about the gods, and uses higher terms of portrayal, making as it were a noble sport