Plato, Laws 661d

σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὄντως ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά· ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην, ἆρα συμφωνοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἢ πῶς; τὰ μὲν ἔμοιγε φαινόμεθά πως, τὰ δʼ οὐδαμῶς. ἆρʼ οὖν ὑγίειάν τε κεκτημένον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους—καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι ὑμῖν ἰσχὺν διαφέρουσαν

what I assert is that what are called evils are good for the unjust, but evil for the just, while the so-called goods are really good for the good, but bad for the bad. Are you in accord with me, then,—that was my question,—or how stands the matter? We are, apparently, partly in accord, but partly quite the reverse. Take the case of a man who has health and wealth and absolute power in perpetuity,—in addition to which I bestow on him, if you like, matchless strength and courage, together with immortality