Plato, Laws 820a

πλάτος, καὶ βάθος ὡσαύτως δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει. σφόδρα γε. εἰ δʼ ἔστι μήτε σφόδρα μήτε ἠρέμα δυνατὰ ἔνια, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή, σὺ δὲ πάντα ἡγῇ, πῶς οἴει πρὸς ταῦτα διακεῖσθαι; δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως. τί δʼ αὖ μῆκός τε καὶ πλάτος πρὸς βάθος, ἢ πλάτος τε καὶ μῆκος πρὸς ἄλληλα; ἆρʼ οὐ διανοούμεθα περὶ ταῦτα οὕτως Ἕλληνες πάντες, ὡς δυνατά ἐστι μετρεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα ἁμῶς γέ πως;

and solid with solid? Absolutely. But supposing that some of them are neither absolutely nor moderately commensurable, some being commensurable and some not, whereas you regard them all as commensurable,—what do you think of your mental state with respect to them? Evidently it is a sorry state. Again, as regards the relation of line and surface to solid, or of surface and line to each other—do not all we Greeks imagine that these are somehow commensurable with one another?