Plato, Laws 937e

ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκεν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; καλοῦ δὲ ὄντος τούτου, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὸ συνδικεῖν ἡμῖν γίγνοιτʼ ἂν καλόν; ταῦτα οὖν τοιαῦτα ὄντα διαβάλλει τις κάκη, καλὸν ὄνομα προστησαμένη τέχνην, ἣ πρῶτον μὲν δή φησιν εἶναί τινα δικῶν μηχανήν—εἶναι δʼ αὐτὴ τοῦ τε δικάσασθαι καὶ συνδικεῖν ἄλλῳ—νικᾶν δυναμένην, ἄντʼ οὖν δίκαια ἄντε μὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίκην ἑκάστην ᾖ πεπραγμένα·

None would deny that justice between men is a fair thing, and that it has civilized all human affairs. And if justice be fair, how can we deny that pleading is also a fair thing? But these fair things are in disrepute owing to a kind of foul art, which, cloaking itself under a fair name, claims, first, that there exists a device for dealing with lawsuits, and further, that it is the one which is able, by pleading and helping another to plead, to win the victory, whether the pleas concerned